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umerous committees have formed
to suggest ways of restoring fiscal
stability. Some come from the
political right or left, but the most
interesting include members who span the
ideological spectrum. The most important is
the president’s National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform (NCFRR 2010).
The president appointed six members drawn
from both political parties, and Democratic
and Republican congressional leaders each
appointed six elected members—three from
the House and three from the Senate. The
commission’s rules stated that Congress had to
consider its recommendations if at least 14
commission members supported them. That
ensured that at least two elected members
from each party had to be on board before the
Congress would be forced to act.
Few budget watchers thought the commis-
sion had any chance of success, especially after
congressional leaders appointed some mem-
bers from the extremes of their parties. But
commission members and their staffs worked
diligently in a collegial fashion. They finally
recommended radical revenue-raising tax
reform, a 15-cent increase in the gas tax, com-
prehensive Social Security reform, options to
restrain growth in federal spending on health
care, and severe caps on defense and nonde-
fense discretionary spending.
Only 11 members ultimately voted for the
commission report, but the fact that it got
more than majority support was a notable
achievement. Moreover, support spanned the
ideological spectrum from Senator Tom
Coburn (R, OK), one of the most conservative
members of the Senate, to Senator Richard
Durbin (D, IL), a solid liberal. Although the
Republican Party has adamantly opposed tax
increases, three Republican senators voted for
a plan that contained significant new revenues.
The commission claimed that by 2020, roughly
70 percent of its deficit reduction would come
from slowing noninterest spending growth
and 30 percent from revenue increases.1 In the
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•the president’s national Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Debt
Reduction task Force are the most prominent
deficit-reduction committees.
•both agree that social security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid reforms are necessary.
•the committees have advocated policy options
such as tax reforms that otherwise would 
have been politically infeasible.
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long run, the commission held spending to 21
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a
severe limit given the costs of an aging popu-
lation and ever more expensive health care.
A private bipartisan committee called the
Debt Reduction Task Force (DRTF) and
headed by former Senator Pete Domenici (R,
NM) and Alice Rivlin, President Clinton’s
director of the Office of Management and
Budget, also recommends radical tax reform,
enforceable limits on Medicare and Medicaid
cost growth, Social Security reform, and a
stringent approach to discretionary spending
(DRTF 2010). However, their deficit reduc-
tions relied more heavily on tax increases than
did the president’s commission. The task force
recommended a new value-added tax (VAT) to
supplement the existing tax system.2
So far none of the committees has received
enthusiastic support from elected officials. The
president has been tepid in his support of his
own commission, looking favorably only on
their tax reform suggestions. Speaker Pelosi
dubbed an earlier version of the commission
report “unacceptable,” and as this is written,
Speaker Boehner praised the commission for
drawing attention to the budget problem but
said nothing about their proposed solutions.3
Nevertheless, the output of the president’s
commission and various committees is
extremely valuable. They offer a rich variety of
policy options, and that will be useful when we
finally act on our budget problems. The fact
that radical tax reform appears in more than
one report makes an option that appeared ear-
lier to be implausible worthy of discussion.
Perhaps most important, the experience of the
president’s commission and the DRTF shows
there are policy packages that can get biparti-
san support even in an intensely partisan era.
health Policy
The presidential commission report identifies
federal spending on health care as “our single
largest fiscal challenge over the long run” and
offers recommendations for both the near and
long term to reduce the growth of such spend-
ing and “slow the growth of health care costs
more broadly” (NCFRR 2100, 36). The principal
concerns for the near term are to offset the
deficit costs of fixing Medicare’s flawed sustain-
able growth-rate payment formula for physi-
cians and to reform or repeal the financially
unsound Community Living Assistance Services
and Support (CLASS) Act, recently enacted in
the health reform Affordable Care Act (ACA).4
To this end, the report recommends numerous
specific health-spending changes estimated to
yield nearly $400 billion in savings from 2012 to
2020. The ACA contained many provisions
aimed at reducing Medicare and Medicaid costs,
so much of the low hanging (deficit savings)
fruit from these programs is now off the table.
Still, four commission recommendations affect-
ing these programs account for the lion’s share of
total near-term savings: expanding cost sharing
in Medicare (along with instituting a cap),
increasing pharmaceutical companies’ rebates
for prescription drugs for Medicare beneficiaries,
reducing Medicare’s subsidies to teaching hospi-
tals for graduate medical education, and restrict-
ing states’ ability to artificially inflate reported
spending on Medicaid to increase their federal
match. Variants of the first two recommenda-
tions are also included in the DRTF report.
For the long term (post-2020), the presi-
dent’s commission report recommends “a
process for reviewing total federal health care
spending [including the exchange subsidies
under the ACA and the cost of the tax exclusion
for health insurance5] … with the target of
holding growth to GDP plus 1 percent and
requiring action by the president and Congress
if the growth exceeds [it]” (36). This is an
incredibly ambitious goal, but a necessary one
to eventually constrain total federal spending to
the report’s recommended 21 percent of GDP.
The report acknowledges that more substantial
structural reforms to the health care system
than those in the ACA will be required to hit
this target, unless the latter prove far more suc-
cessful in slowing federal health care spending
than the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
and the Medicare actuary project. But rather
than recommend any particular reforms, the
report tersely identifies—without content or
comment—a grab bag of wide-ranging policy
options suggested by commission members.
Many experts believe establishing some sort
of fixed budget for at least the major compo-
nents of federal spending on health care may
eventually be necessary to keep it anywhere
near the presidential commission target. The
DRTF plan moves in this direction by recom-
mending, as the main pillars of a coherent long-
term strategy, the adoption of three presidential
commission members’ bolder suggestions for
restraining long-term growth of federal health
care costs. First, its recommended phaseout of
the tax exclusion for health insurance would
totally eliminate this huge tax expenditure as
well as foster more cost-conscious choices by
those purchasing private health insurance.
Second, it would convert Medicare into a “pre-
mium support” system, essentially providing
beneficiaries with a voucher whose value grows
over time at the rate of per capita GDP growth
plus 1 percent to use toward either the costs of
traditional fee-for-service Medicare or a com-
peting private plan offered on a newly created
Medicare exchange. This change would not
only constrain the growth of federal spending
on Medicare to a level well below current pro-
jections, but also dampen underlying health
care cost increases by making beneficiaries who
remain in traditional Medicare more cost con-
scious. (They will be forced to pay additional
premiums if Medicare costs per beneficiary rise
faster than the value of the voucher.) The pro-
posal would also foster competition among
plans on the exchange, leading them to manage
quality care delivery in a more cost-efficient
manner. Finally, the DRTF plan calls for chang-
ing the incentives inherent in current complex
financial arrangements between the federal and
state governments, so as to substantially slow
the growth of Medicaid costs and limit the fed-
eral government’s open-ended liability.
Many aspects of the DRTF plan’s long-term
strategy are worrisome, chief among which is
the extent its elements—on top of the reforms
already set in motion by the ACA—actually
would slow the underlying growth of sys-
temwide per capita health care costs. Unless sys-
temwide growth slows commensurately with
that of per capita costs for Medicare and
Medicaid, it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to achieve the desired savings without
unduly undermining beneficiaries’ access to
quality health care. But the DRTF plan at least
advances a coherent, concrete, and plausible
approach to the “single largest fiscal challenge
over the long run.”
social security
The presidential commission’s plan for Social
Security is designed to eliminate the program’s
75-year deficit and put it on a sustainable path
thereafter by both increasing revenues and
reducing costs over time relative to those cur-
rently scheduled. Absent any such changes,
the pending large increase in the number of
beneficiaries relative to workers will soon
result in rapidly growing cash flow deficits for
the Social Security trust fund and the draw-
down of its reserves until depleted in 2037—at
which time an across-the-board benefit cut for
current and future beneficiaries of at least 22
percent would be required.
Five commission recommendations would
improve Social Security’s financial outlook.
1. Modify the benefit formula to slow the
growth of future benefits. The wage-
adjusted benefit levels of new retirees,
except those with very low covered earnings
histories, would decline in a progressive
manner relative to those of comparable
recipients today. But the modifications
would be phased in slowly from 2017 to
2050 and would ensure that all future bene-
ficiaries continue to receive higher inflation-
adjusted benefits than earlier generations.
2. Index the normal retirement age (NRA)
and the early eligibility age (EEA) to life
expectancy. This provision is intended to
maintain a constant ratio of years in retire-
ment to years in adulthood as longevity
increases. It would raise the NRA (now
scheduled to be 67 in 2027 and thereafter)
to 68 in about 2050 and 69 in about 2075,
with the EEA (currently 62) moving in tan-
dem to 63 and 64.
3. Increase the wages subject to the Social
Security payroll tax. In the early 1980s, tax-
able wages under the cap—currently
$106,800 and indexed to the average growth
of covered wages—were 90 percent of all
wages. Since then, wages below the cap have
grown more slowly than those above it, such
that barely 82 percent of all wages will be
subject to the payroll tax by 2020. This pro-
vision would gradually increase the cap to
the 90 percent mark by 2050.
4. Substitute the chained consumer price
index (CPI), a more accurate measure of
inflation, for the current version of the
CPI used to calculate annual cost-of-living
adjustments to Social Security benefits.6
5. Phase in coverage of the one-quarter of
the state and local workforce currently
outside Social Security.
Four other recommendations would modify
Social Security, at modest or no cost, to better
support the most vulnerable recipients and to
introduce new flexibilities and protections in
conjunction with an indexed retirement age.
1. A new special minimum benefit would pro-
vide full-career workers (with 30 or more
years of covered earnings) with a benefit no
less than 125 percent of the federal poverty
level starting in 2017 (and indexed to wages
thereafter), with a proportionately lower
guaranteed benefit for workers with 10 to 29
years of covered earnings.
2. A benefit enhancement for the long-lived
and the long-time disabled, who are at
risk of outliving their own retirement
resources, would bump up their benefit
levels 20 years after initial eligibility by 5
percent of the average benefit level.
3. A new option for retirement claiming,
permitting collection of up to half of ben-
efits as early as 62 with the applicable actu-
arial reduction and the other half at a later
age, would provide a smoother transition
for those interested in phased retirement or
for households in which one member has
retired and the other continues to work.
4. An early retirement hardship exemption
for those who may not qualify for disabil-
ity benefits but are physically unable to
work beyond the current EEA. The pro-
posal would allow them to continue to
claim benefits at age 62, as the EEA and
NRA increase, without any additional
actuarial reductions.
The presidential commission plan relies more
heavily—and more so over time—on benefit-
cost reductions than on revenue increases to
ensure Social Security’s long-run solvency
(table 1). More than three-fifths of the
improvement in the program’s finances over
the next 75 years is due to provisions directly
affecting benefit levels; by the 75th year this
ratio rises above four-fifths (Goss 2010). As a
result, most new retirees would experience
benefit reductions (relative to currently
scheduled benefits for comparable workers) of
increasing amounts over time, ranging by
mid-century from an average of 9 percent for
the middle earnings quintile to 19 percent for
the top quintile (NCFRR 2010, figure 13).7
Those with lower lifetime covered earnings
would be well protected by other plan provi-
sions, with the lowest earners actually receiv-
ing a benefit more than one-third higher
because of the new special minimum. So con-
cern about the plan’s benefit reductions would
likely focus on future beneficiaries in the
broad middle of the lifetime earnings distri-
bution, as well as on those with more limited
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long run, the commission held spending to 21
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a
severe limit given the costs of an aging popu-
lation and ever more expensive health care.
A private bipartisan committee called the
Debt Reduction Task Force (DRTF) and
headed by former Senator Pete Domenici (R,
NM) and Alice Rivlin, President Clinton’s
director of the Office of Management and
Budget, also recommends radical tax reform,
enforceable limits on Medicare and Medicaid
cost growth, Social Security reform, and a
stringent approach to discretionary spending
(DRTF 2010). However, their deficit reduc-
tions relied more heavily on tax increases than
did the president’s commission. The task force
recommended a new value-added tax (VAT) to
supplement the existing tax system.2
So far none of the committees has received
enthusiastic support from elected officials. The
president has been tepid in his support of his
own commission, looking favorably only on
their tax reform suggestions. Speaker Pelosi
dubbed an earlier version of the commission
report “unacceptable,” and as this is written,
Speaker Boehner praised the commission for
drawing attention to the budget problem but
said nothing about their proposed solutions.3
Nevertheless, the output of the president’s
commission and various committees is
extremely valuable. They offer a rich variety of
policy options, and that will be useful when we
finally act on our budget problems. The fact
that radical tax reform appears in more than
one report makes an option that appeared ear-
lier to be implausible worthy of discussion.
Perhaps most important, the experience of the
president’s commission and the DRTF shows
there are policy packages that can get biparti-
san support even in an intensely partisan era.
health Policy
The presidential commission report identifies
federal spending on health care as “our single
largest fiscal challenge over the long run” and
offers recommendations for both the near and
long term to reduce the growth of such spend-
ing and “slow the growth of health care costs
more broadly” (NCFRR 2100, 36). The principal
concerns for the near term are to offset the
deficit costs of fixing Medicare’s flawed sustain-
able growth-rate payment formula for physi-
cians and to reform or repeal the financially
unsound Community Living Assistance Services
and Support (CLASS) Act, recently enacted in
the health reform Affordable Care Act (ACA).4
To this end, the report recommends numerous
specific health-spending changes estimated to
yield nearly $400 billion in savings from 2012 to
2020. The ACA contained many provisions
aimed at reducing Medicare and Medicaid costs,
so much of the low hanging (deficit savings)
fruit from these programs is now off the table.
Still, four commission recommendations affect-
ing these programs account for the lion’s share of
total near-term savings: expanding cost sharing
in Medicare (along with instituting a cap),
increasing pharmaceutical companies’ rebates
for prescription drugs for Medicare beneficiaries,
reducing Medicare’s subsidies to teaching hospi-
tals for graduate medical education, and restrict-
ing states’ ability to artificially inflate reported
spending on Medicaid to increase their federal
match. Variants of the first two recommenda-
tions are also included in the DRTF report.
For the long term (post-2020), the presi-
dent’s commission report recommends “a
process for reviewing total federal health care
spending [including the exchange subsidies
under the ACA and the cost of the tax exclusion
for health insurance5] … with the target of
holding growth to GDP plus 1 percent and
requiring action by the president and Congress
if the growth exceeds [it]” (36). This is an
incredibly ambitious goal, but a necessary one
to eventually constrain total federal spending to
the report’s recommended 21 percent of GDP.
The report acknowledges that more substantial
structural reforms to the health care system
than those in the ACA will be required to hit
this target, unless the latter prove far more suc-
cessful in slowing federal health care spending
than the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
and the Medicare actuary project. But rather
than recommend any particular reforms, the
report tersely identifies—without content or
comment—a grab bag of wide-ranging policy
options suggested by commission members.
Many experts believe establishing some sort
of fixed budget for at least the major compo-
nents of federal spending on health care may
eventually be necessary to keep it anywhere
near the presidential commission target. The
DRTF plan moves in this direction by recom-
mending, as the main pillars of a coherent long-
term strategy, the adoption of three presidential
commission members’ bolder suggestions for
restraining long-term growth of federal health
care costs. First, its recommended phaseout of
the tax exclusion for health insurance would
totally eliminate this huge tax expenditure as
well as foster more cost-conscious choices by
those purchasing private health insurance.
Second, it would convert Medicare into a “pre-
mium support” system, essentially providing
beneficiaries with a voucher whose value grows
over time at the rate of per capita GDP growth
plus 1 percent to use toward either the costs of
traditional fee-for-service Medicare or a com-
peting private plan offered on a newly created
Medicare exchange. This change would not
only constrain the growth of federal spending
on Medicare to a level well below current pro-
jections, but also dampen underlying health
care cost increases by making beneficiaries who
remain in traditional Medicare more cost con-
scious. (They will be forced to pay additional
premiums if Medicare costs per beneficiary rise
faster than the value of the voucher.) The pro-
posal would also foster competition among
plans on the exchange, leading them to manage
quality care delivery in a more cost-efficient
manner. Finally, the DRTF plan calls for chang-
ing the incentives inherent in current complex
financial arrangements between the federal and
state governments, so as to substantially slow
the growth of Medicaid costs and limit the fed-
eral government’s open-ended liability.
Many aspects of the DRTF plan’s long-term
strategy are worrisome, chief among which is
the extent its elements—on top of the reforms
already set in motion by the ACA—actually
would slow the underlying growth of sys-
temwide per capita health care costs. Unless sys-
temwide growth slows commensurately with
that of per capita costs for Medicare and
Medicaid, it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to achieve the desired savings without
unduly undermining beneficiaries’ access to
quality health care. But the DRTF plan at least
advances a coherent, concrete, and plausible
approach to the “single largest fiscal challenge
over the long run.”
social security
The presidential commission’s plan for Social
Security is designed to eliminate the program’s
75-year deficit and put it on a sustainable path
thereafter by both increasing revenues and
reducing costs over time relative to those cur-
rently scheduled. Absent any such changes,
the pending large increase in the number of
beneficiaries relative to workers will soon
result in rapidly growing cash flow deficits for
the Social Security trust fund and the draw-
down of its reserves until depleted in 2037—at
which time an across-the-board benefit cut for
current and future beneficiaries of at least 22
percent would be required.
Five commission recommendations would
improve Social Security’s financial outlook.
1. Modify the benefit formula to slow the
growth of future benefits. The wage-
adjusted benefit levels of new retirees,
except those with very low covered earnings
histories, would decline in a progressive
manner relative to those of comparable
recipients today. But the modifications
would be phased in slowly from 2017 to
2050 and would ensure that all future bene-
ficiaries continue to receive higher inflation-
adjusted benefits than earlier generations.
2. Index the normal retirement age (NRA)
and the early eligibility age (EEA) to life
expectancy. This provision is intended to
maintain a constant ratio of years in retire-
ment to years in adulthood as longevity
increases. It would raise the NRA (now
scheduled to be 67 in 2027 and thereafter)
to 68 in about 2050 and 69 in about 2075,
with the EEA (currently 62) moving in tan-
dem to 63 and 64.
3. Increase the wages subject to the Social
Security payroll tax. In the early 1980s, tax-
able wages under the cap—currently
$106,800 and indexed to the average growth
of covered wages—were 90 percent of all
wages. Since then, wages below the cap have
grown more slowly than those above it, such
that barely 82 percent of all wages will be
subject to the payroll tax by 2020. This pro-
vision would gradually increase the cap to
the 90 percent mark by 2050.
4. Substitute the chained consumer price
index (CPI), a more accurate measure of
inflation, for the current version of the
CPI used to calculate annual cost-of-living
adjustments to Social Security benefits.6
5. Phase in coverage of the one-quarter of
the state and local workforce currently
outside Social Security.
Four other recommendations would modify
Social Security, at modest or no cost, to better
support the most vulnerable recipients and to
introduce new flexibilities and protections in
conjunction with an indexed retirement age.
1. A new special minimum benefit would pro-
vide full-career workers (with 30 or more
years of covered earnings) with a benefit no
less than 125 percent of the federal poverty
level starting in 2017 (and indexed to wages
thereafter), with a proportionately lower
guaranteed benefit for workers with 10 to 29
years of covered earnings.
2. A benefit enhancement for the long-lived
and the long-time disabled, who are at
risk of outliving their own retirement
resources, would bump up their benefit
levels 20 years after initial eligibility by 5
percent of the average benefit level.
3. A new option for retirement claiming,
permitting collection of up to half of ben-
efits as early as 62 with the applicable actu-
arial reduction and the other half at a later
age, would provide a smoother transition
for those interested in phased retirement or
for households in which one member has
retired and the other continues to work.
4. An early retirement hardship exemption
for those who may not qualify for disabil-
ity benefits but are physically unable to
work beyond the current EEA. The pro-
posal would allow them to continue to
claim benefits at age 62, as the EEA and
NRA increase, without any additional
actuarial reductions.
The presidential commission plan relies more
heavily—and more so over time—on benefit-
cost reductions than on revenue increases to
ensure Social Security’s long-run solvency
(table 1). More than three-fifths of the
improvement in the program’s finances over
the next 75 years is due to provisions directly
affecting benefit levels; by the 75th year this
ratio rises above four-fifths (Goss 2010). As a
result, most new retirees would experience
benefit reductions (relative to currently
scheduled benefits for comparable workers) of
increasing amounts over time, ranging by
mid-century from an average of 9 percent for
the middle earnings quintile to 19 percent for
the top quintile (NCFRR 2010, figure 13).7
Those with lower lifetime covered earnings
would be well protected by other plan provi-
sions, with the lowest earners actually receiv-
ing a benefit more than one-third higher
because of the new special minimum. So con-
cern about the plan’s benefit reductions would
likely focus on future beneficiaries in the
broad middle of the lifetime earnings distri-
bution, as well as on those with more limited
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lifetime earnings due to long absences from
the labor force. Both groups are likely to
remain highly dependent upon Social
Security to maintain their preretirement stan-
dard of living, while also facing out-of-pocket
health care costs (including Medicare premi-
ums) growing faster than their inflation-
adjusted benefits. Nonetheless, they would
likely be much better off in the long run than
if program solvency were not restored and
budget deficits spiraled out of control.
The DRTF’s plan for Social Security pro-
vides an interesting contrast, since it entails
provisions similar to those of the president’s
commission, plus several others. But its pro-
gressive benefit-formula reduction affects only
high lifetime earners and yields far less savings,
while its supplementary provisions provide
additional revenue of a bit more than 1 percent
of taxable payroll—principally by phasing out
the income and payroll tax exclusions for
employer-sponsored health insurance. As a
consequence, the DRTF plan relies more
equally on reduced costs and increased rev-
enues over time and results in more moderate
benefit reductions.8 However, the presidential
commission’s plan is designed to ensure Social
Security’s solvency as a stand-alone proposal;
the report indicates that any additional trust-
fund revenue resulting from tax reform “will
provide flexibility to moderate the changes in
benefits or taxation recommended by the
commission” (NCFRR 2010, 54). Thus, were
the tax exclusion for health insurance phased
out, the consequent fiscal flexibility could
soften the impact of benefit reductions on
future beneficiaries of most concern.
Another interesting point of contrast
between the two plans is the different means by
which they adjust the future retiree benefits to
increases in life expectancy. Under the DRTF
plan, both the EEA and the NRA would remain
the same as under current law, while the for-
mula for calculating initial benefits would be
indexed to achieve the same result, as would
indexing the NRA. This could be a more polit-
ically palatable approach to indexing to
longevity, since it still allows retirees to claim
benefits at age 62—albeit with a larger actuarial
reduction than under current law. It also elimi-
nates the need for the commission’s hardship
exemption from the higher EEA, which would
be difficult to implement in practice. However,
the signal that younger generations need to
work longer in order to adequately provide for
retirement would be lost.9
Finally, we note that neither plan includes
any form of individual account, a cornerstone
of President Bush’s proposed reform of Social
Security. The economy tanking and the
recent stock market collapse have reduced the
appeal of individual accounts, but they still
appear in some form in William Galston and
Maya MacGuineas’s budget reform plans
(2010), House Budget Committee Chairman
Paul Ryan’s road map (2010), and the plan put
forward by the conservative Americans for
Tax Reform (2010).
Discretionary spending
The presidential commission’s Social Security
reforms are phased in slowly and its major
health program savings are not achieved until
after 2020. As a result, the commission has to
hit discretionary programs hard to significantly
reduce the deficit in the medium term without
large tax increases. They propose caps on dis-
cretionary spending that would cut 2015
spending levels by $38 billion in nominal terms
compared to spending in 2009 and by about 10
percent in real terms.10 By 2020, real discre-
tionary spending would be almost 18 percent
below 2009 levels. After 2020, discretionary
spending would be allowed to grow with the
CPI. Although 2009 spending was somewhat
inflated by the stimulus program, the recom-
mended cuts are severe given that the demand
for public services will grow with the popula-
tion. Discretionary spending cuts account for
over 45 percent of the deficit reduction pro-
posed for 2015 relative to the commission’s
baseline, while revenue increases account for
about 25 percent and associated interest savings
for 9 percent. The remaining small amount
comes from the early effects of Social Security
and health reform and from reforms to other
mandatory spending programs. The commis-
sion’s caps are enforced by points of order and
by automatic spending cuts if the points of
order are not upheld.11
In suggesting approaches to getting under
the cap, the commission does not identify spe-
cific program cuts or eliminations in the body
of their report. Instead, the commission takes
the indirect approach of advocating a three-
year civil service pay freeze, a reduction in the
civil service, a reduction of travel and vehicle
expenses, and symbolic cuts in congressional
and White House budgets. Such savings
amount to over $35 billion for 2015.12 That
compares to the $172 billion in savings neces-
sary to get under the 2015 cap. On its web site,
the commission provides options for saving
$100 billion in defense and the same amount
in nondefense programs. Most of the defense
options are quite specific and many would cut
weapons systems, such as the V-22 Osprey air-
craft. The nondefense list contains a number of
program cuts, such as eliminating the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, but also lists
options whose effects are harder to discern,
such as creating a cut-and-invest committee
that would have a goal of saving $11 billion.
Both the president’s commission and the DRTF
suggest more public investment. However,
increases in investment spending would have to
be offset by reductions in current spending to
stay under the discretionary spending caps.
The commission’s severe spending caps
obviously become more politically feasible if
they avoid naming explicit program cuts and
arousing the programs’ constituencies. But the
commission’s indirect cuts are hard to evaluate.
Clearly, some civil servants are overpaid (and
some underpaid), but it is important to ask
what a pay freeze will do to the quantity and
quality of civil servants who are recruited.
Similarly, the commission’s reductions of the
civil service and their travel expenses are prob-
ably warranted in some agencies, but they may
be more dubious for those charged with eval-
uating disability claims or enforcing tax laws.
Moreover, reducing staff by attrition, as the
commission recommends, may not be the
most efficient approach.
The DRTF follows a similar strategy for
controlling discretionary spending, but the
implied cuts from baseline levels are much less
severe. They advocate a four-year nominal
freeze of nondefense discretion spending for
2012 to 2015. After that, the programs are
allowed to grow with the economy. That com-
pares to the real, absolute cuts advocated by the
president’s commission. For defense, the DRTF
advocates a five-year freeze and growth with
the economy thereafter. Like the president’s
commission, the task force seems reluctant to
recommend specific program cuts, but lists
numerous illustrative examples. There is much
overlap between their list and the commission’s.
Other Mandatory Programs
The president’s commission suggests reforms
in mandatory programs other than health 
and Social Security, such as civil service retire-
ment programs and agricultural subsidies.
Additional deficit reductions are suggested for
the student loan program and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The report
includes proposals for increasing various fees
and charges for goods and services sold by gov-
ernment agencies. Many of these same recom-
mendations can be found in the DRTF report.
tax Policy
It is almost impossible to imagine a compro-
mise solution to the long-run budget prob-
lem that does not involve revenue increases,
and it is almost certain that a compromise
will be necessary. No party is sufficiently
dominant to impose a solution on its own.
All experts agree that one of the least desir-
able ways of raising revenues is to raise the
tax rates in our current highly inefficient and
inequitable individual and corporate income
tax systems. That leaves two options. Our
income tax systems can be radically reformed
to raise revenues more equitably and effi-
ciently with lower marginal tax rates, or 
revenues can be raised using some other tax.
The president’s commission and the DRTF
suggest both options in different proportions.
The National Academies committee suggested
radical tax reform as one revenue-raising
option, and other committees recommend less
dramatic tax reforms.
Radical tax reform involves eliminating or
greatly reducing the value of the many deduc-
tions, credits, special rates, and income exclu-
sions that riddle our individual and corporate
income tax system. These are known as tax
expenditures and the president’s commission
estimates their current annual value at $1.1 tril-
lion. The proceeds from reducing the value of
tax expenditures can be divided into two por-
tions. One can be used for increasing revenues
while the other is applied to reducing mar-
ginal tax rates. The tax system then becomes
fairer, because those in a position to easily use
tax expenditures see their advantage reduced
or eliminated. The system becomes more 
efficient because incentives are improved as
the reform reduces the amount taxed from
each extra dollar earned from work or received
from savings. Moreover, choices are less often
distorted by tax provisions that favor one form
of economic activity over others.
The president’s commission recommends
applying $80 billion of the proceeds from tax
reform to deficit reduction in 2015 and $180
billion in 2020. Its analysis is particularly use-
ful, because it clearly illustrates the trade-offs
between eliminating or reducing particular
tax expenditures and the marginal tax rates
table 1. existing shortfall Closed by Commission’s 
social security Reform Provisions (%)
4. 5.
Over 75 years In 75th year
Reduce future benefits in a progressive manner through 45 51
a change in the benefit formula
Index the nRA and the eeA to longevity and 18 30
include a hardship exemption
Increase the taxable maximum to cover 90% of earnings 35 22
Apply an improved CPI to cost-of-living adjustments in benefits 26 17
Cover all newly hired state and local workers 8 0
Create new special minimum benefit -8 -6
enhance benefits for the long-lived and the long-time disabled -8 -6
Add new option for early, partial benefit claiming n.a. n.a.
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lifetime earnings due to long absences from
the labor force. Both groups are likely to
remain highly dependent upon Social
Security to maintain their preretirement stan-
dard of living, while also facing out-of-pocket
health care costs (including Medicare premi-
ums) growing faster than their inflation-
adjusted benefits. Nonetheless, they would
likely be much better off in the long run than
if program solvency were not restored and
budget deficits spiraled out of control.
The DRTF’s plan for Social Security pro-
vides an interesting contrast, since it entails
provisions similar to those of the president’s
commission, plus several others. But its pro-
gressive benefit-formula reduction affects only
high lifetime earners and yields far less savings,
while its supplementary provisions provide
additional revenue of a bit more than 1 percent
of taxable payroll—principally by phasing out
the income and payroll tax exclusions for
employer-sponsored health insurance. As a
consequence, the DRTF plan relies more
equally on reduced costs and increased rev-
enues over time and results in more moderate
benefit reductions.8 However, the presidential
commission’s plan is designed to ensure Social
Security’s solvency as a stand-alone proposal;
the report indicates that any additional trust-
fund revenue resulting from tax reform “will
provide flexibility to moderate the changes in
benefits or taxation recommended by the
commission” (NCFRR 2010, 54). Thus, were
the tax exclusion for health insurance phased
out, the consequent fiscal flexibility could
soften the impact of benefit reductions on
future beneficiaries of most concern.
Another interesting point of contrast
between the two plans is the different means by
which they adjust the future retiree benefits to
increases in life expectancy. Under the DRTF
plan, both the EEA and the NRA would remain
the same as under current law, while the for-
mula for calculating initial benefits would be
indexed to achieve the same result, as would
indexing the NRA. This could be a more polit-
ically palatable approach to indexing to
longevity, since it still allows retirees to claim
benefits at age 62—albeit with a larger actuarial
reduction than under current law. It also elimi-
nates the need for the commission’s hardship
exemption from the higher EEA, which would
be difficult to implement in practice. However,
the signal that younger generations need to
work longer in order to adequately provide for
retirement would be lost.9
Finally, we note that neither plan includes
any form of individual account, a cornerstone
of President Bush’s proposed reform of Social
Security. The economy tanking and the
recent stock market collapse have reduced the
appeal of individual accounts, but they still
appear in some form in William Galston and
Maya MacGuineas’s budget reform plans
(2010), House Budget Committee Chairman
Paul Ryan’s road map (2010), and the plan put
forward by the conservative Americans for
Tax Reform (2010).
Discretionary spending
The presidential commission’s Social Security
reforms are phased in slowly and its major
health program savings are not achieved until
after 2020. As a result, the commission has to
hit discretionary programs hard to significantly
reduce the deficit in the medium term without
large tax increases. They propose caps on dis-
cretionary spending that would cut 2015
spending levels by $38 billion in nominal terms
compared to spending in 2009 and by about 10
percent in real terms.10 By 2020, real discre-
tionary spending would be almost 18 percent
below 2009 levels. After 2020, discretionary
spending would be allowed to grow with the
CPI. Although 2009 spending was somewhat
inflated by the stimulus program, the recom-
mended cuts are severe given that the demand
for public services will grow with the popula-
tion. Discretionary spending cuts account for
over 45 percent of the deficit reduction pro-
posed for 2015 relative to the commission’s
baseline, while revenue increases account for
about 25 percent and associated interest savings
for 9 percent. The remaining small amount
comes from the early effects of Social Security
and health reform and from reforms to other
mandatory spending programs. The commis-
sion’s caps are enforced by points of order and
by automatic spending cuts if the points of
order are not upheld.11
In suggesting approaches to getting under
the cap, the commission does not identify spe-
cific program cuts or eliminations in the body
of their report. Instead, the commission takes
the indirect approach of advocating a three-
year civil service pay freeze, a reduction in the
civil service, a reduction of travel and vehicle
expenses, and symbolic cuts in congressional
and White House budgets. Such savings
amount to over $35 billion for 2015.12 That
compares to the $172 billion in savings neces-
sary to get under the 2015 cap. On its web site,
the commission provides options for saving
$100 billion in defense and the same amount
in nondefense programs. Most of the defense
options are quite specific and many would cut
weapons systems, such as the V-22 Osprey air-
craft. The nondefense list contains a number of
program cuts, such as eliminating the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, but also lists
options whose effects are harder to discern,
such as creating a cut-and-invest committee
that would have a goal of saving $11 billion.
Both the president’s commission and the DRTF
suggest more public investment. However,
increases in investment spending would have to
be offset by reductions in current spending to
stay under the discretionary spending caps.
The commission’s severe spending caps
obviously become more politically feasible if
they avoid naming explicit program cuts and
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commission’s indirect cuts are hard to evaluate.
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what a pay freeze will do to the quantity and
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civil service and their travel expenses are prob-
ably warranted in some agencies, but they may
be more dubious for those charged with eval-
uating disability claims or enforcing tax laws.
Moreover, reducing staff by attrition, as the
commission recommends, may not be the
most efficient approach.
The DRTF follows a similar strategy for
controlling discretionary spending, but the
implied cuts from baseline levels are much less
severe. They advocate a four-year nominal
freeze of nondefense discretion spending for
2012 to 2015. After that, the programs are
allowed to grow with the economy. That com-
pares to the real, absolute cuts advocated by the
president’s commission. For defense, the DRTF
advocates a five-year freeze and growth with
the economy thereafter. Like the president’s
commission, the task force seems reluctant to
recommend specific program cuts, but lists
numerous illustrative examples. There is much
overlap between their list and the commission’s.
Other Mandatory Programs
The president’s commission suggests reforms
in mandatory programs other than health 
and Social Security, such as civil service retire-
ment programs and agricultural subsidies.
Additional deficit reductions are suggested for
the student loan program and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The report
includes proposals for increasing various fees
and charges for goods and services sold by gov-
ernment agencies. Many of these same recom-
mendations can be found in the DRTF report.
tax Policy
It is almost impossible to imagine a compro-
mise solution to the long-run budget prob-
lem that does not involve revenue increases,
and it is almost certain that a compromise
will be necessary. No party is sufficiently
dominant to impose a solution on its own.
All experts agree that one of the least desir-
able ways of raising revenues is to raise the
tax rates in our current highly inefficient and
inequitable individual and corporate income
tax systems. That leaves two options. Our
income tax systems can be radically reformed
to raise revenues more equitably and effi-
ciently with lower marginal tax rates, or 
revenues can be raised using some other tax.
The president’s commission and the DRTF
suggest both options in different proportions.
The National Academies committee suggested
radical tax reform as one revenue-raising
option, and other committees recommend less
dramatic tax reforms.
Radical tax reform involves eliminating or
greatly reducing the value of the many deduc-
tions, credits, special rates, and income exclu-
sions that riddle our individual and corporate
income tax system. These are known as tax
expenditures and the president’s commission
estimates their current annual value at $1.1 tril-
lion. The proceeds from reducing the value of
tax expenditures can be divided into two por-
tions. One can be used for increasing revenues
while the other is applied to reducing mar-
ginal tax rates. The tax system then becomes
fairer, because those in a position to easily use
tax expenditures see their advantage reduced
or eliminated. The system becomes more 
efficient because incentives are improved as
the reform reduces the amount taxed from
each extra dollar earned from work or received
from savings. Moreover, choices are less often
distorted by tax provisions that favor one form
of economic activity over others.
The president’s commission recommends
applying $80 billion of the proceeds from tax
reform to deficit reduction in 2015 and $180
billion in 2020. Its analysis is particularly use-
ful, because it clearly illustrates the trade-offs
between eliminating or reducing particular
tax expenditures and the marginal tax rates
table 1. existing shortfall Closed by Commission’s 
social security Reform Provisions (%)
4. 5.
Over 75 years In 75th year
Reduce future benefits in a progressive manner through 45 51
a change in the benefit formula
Index the nRA and the eeA to longevity and 18 30
include a hardship exemption
Increase the taxable maximum to cover 90% of earnings 35 22
Apply an improved CPI to cost-of-living adjustments in benefits 26 17
Cover all newly hired state and local workers 8 0
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required to raise the targeted amount of rev-
enues. For example, if every single tax expen-
diture is eliminated, the top marginal individ-
ual rate can be lowered to 23 percent13 and the
top corporate rate from 35 to 26 percent. If
the earned income tax credit and the child
credit are retained because they are of partic-
ular value to the poor, the top individual rate
has to be raised to 24 percent. The commis-
sion provides an illustrative tax plan that
retains politically sensitive tax expenditures,
such as the charitable and mortgage interest
deductions, but limits their value. Under this
variant, the top rate falls only to 28 percent.
In the commission plan, capital gains are
taxed at the same rate as ordinary income and
15 cents per gallon is added to the gas tax.
The tax reform proposed by the DRTF is
more complicated but follows the same philos-
ophy. Most tax expenditures are eliminated, but
a few politically sensitive deductions are
retained. As in the president’s commission plan,
tax expenditures are modified to reduce the rev-
enue loss. The tax treatment of lower-income
groups is simplified as are the many provisions
related to retirement and other savings. Capital
gains are taxed the same as ordinary income.
The top tax rate is lowered to 27 percent.
The most important difference between
the presidential commission’s and the DRTF
plan is that the latter imposes a 6.5 percent
VAT, dubbed a deficit reduction sales tax, that
raises over $3 trillion cumulatively through
2020. As a result, the DRTF plan relies consid-
erably more on revenue increases to solve the
deficit problem than does the president’s com-
mission. Both plans use the chained CPI to
index tax brackets instead of the currently used
CPI. The chained index is considered to be
more accurate and is expected to grow more
slowly in the future, increasing revenue growth.
Tax reform is extremely difficult politically,
because many will perceive themselves to be
losers—those who now rely heavily on tax
expenditures to reduce their tax burdens—
even though they may ultimately benefit from
a deficit reduction that reduces the probabil-
ity of a fiscal meltdown. Revenue-neutral tax
reform is hard enough. Revenue-raising tax
reform is even more difficult, because the
number of perceived losers increases. The
plans of the president’s commission and the
DRTF have taken proposals that superficially
seem implausible politically and made them
seem considerably less implausible. That is
because they have clearly described the most
important benefit of reform—more revenues
can be raised with lower tax rates. This is par-
ticularly important to the conservatives who
now adamantly oppose revenue increases.
They certainly will not accept rate increases in
the current system. Radical reform that allows
more revenue to be raised with lower rates is
probably necessary to get them to accept rev-
enue raising. While it is necessary, it may not
be sufficient. Using a new tax as in the DRTF
proposal will also be a hard sell.
Conclusion
Concern over the nation’s deteriorating
budget outlook is rightly growing. There is no
better evidence than the proliferation of com-
mittees offering diagnoses and solutions from
all segments of the ideological spectrum. The
two most prominent are the presidential com-
mission and the DRTF. Both consist of highly
respected individuals from both parties repre-
senting different ideological perspectives. The
two groups completely agree on the nature of
our budget problem but disagree significantly
on the cure, with the DRTF relying far more
on tax increases and less on spending cuts
than the president’s commission. Nevertheless,
both agree on the need for radical tax reform,
and their options for slowing spending over-
lap considerably. 
Both committees have made an enormous
contribution to the national debate by, first,
clearly describing the sources of the budget
problem, and second, showing that very large
policy changes will be necessary to solve it.
Among the changes they describe are Social
Security and health policy reforms and a rad-
ical makeover of our personal and corporate
income tax systems. Such policy reforms are
highly sensitive politically—so much so that
they are often regarded as being implausible.
The presidential commission and the DRTF
have brought the discussion of radical reforms
into the mainstream and waged an all-out
attack on a variety of sacred cows. In doing so,
they have built upon and reinforced the work
of previous committees, such as that spon-
sored by the National Academies. With so
many groups raising the same issues and dis-
cussing similar policy options, the urgency of
our budget problem and the need for bold
and controversial policy changes to address it
can no longer be denied.
Although there is much discussion of the
need for sacrifices to fix the budget problem,
it is important to remember that fixing the
problem also will bring huge benefits. If the
problem is left to fester and the United States
is engulfed by a fiscal crisis, the entire popu-
lation will feel intense pain (Burman et al.
2010; CBO 2010b). Even if a crisis is a long
way off, large deficits will be draining away
national saving in the interim and slowly
eroding improvements in the standard of 
living. The population will suffer much less
from reforms that slow the growth of social
benefits and raise tax revenues.
Unfortunately, the proposals of various
committees have not been greeted with much
enthusiasm by the president or members of
Congress. But it is certain that the budget
problem will have to be fixed eventually.
When that day comes, policymakers will have
thoughtful policy responses available as the
result of the hard work of these committees.
Let us hope that the policy debate is eventu-
ally provoked by a deliberative process rather
than being forced upon us by a fiscal crisis.•
notes
The authors are grateful to Richard Johnson and
James Kaminski for their comments and to the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
for financial support.
1. Dividing deficit reduction between spending
reductions and revenue increases is somewhat
arbitrary because it depends on what an analyst
assumes the deficit to be for a starting point. 
The commission created its own baseline. It is
very similar to the Congressional Budget Office’s
alternative policy baseline. If they had chosen a
baseline with higher spending, the estimated pro-
portion of deficit reduction from spending con-
straints would have been higher.
2. An earlier committee convened by the National
Academies of Science and Public Administration
(Committee on the Fiscal Future of the United
States 2010) put forward radical tax reform 
as one of its revenue-raising options and also 
discussed a VAT, but only in combination with
an unreformed tax system
3. “Boehner Statement on President Obama’s Fiscal
Commission,” press release, Office of the Speaker
of the House, December 3, 2010. http://john-
boehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?
DocumentID=216777.
4. For a discussion of why reducing federal spend-
ing on health care is the nation’s greatest fiscal
challenge and of the problems with the Medicare
sustainable growth-rate physician payment for-
mula, see chapter 5 of Committee on the Fiscal
Future of the United States (2010). For a discus-
sion of the fiscal impact of the ACA and the
CLASS Act, see Palmer and Penner (2010).
5. The commission includes, under the report’s 
recommended approach to tax reform, an adjust-
ment for any changes made to the exclusion. 
6. The chain index would also be used for other
indexed spending programs and to index
individual income tax brackets. For a discussion
of its use to index Social Security benefits, see
Penner (2010). 
7. These are broad averages. A 65-year-old new
retiree at the median of lifetime covered earnings
would experience a benefit reduction of 13 per-
cent in 2050 and 19 percent in 2080, and benefit
reductions for many high lifetime earners would
be far larger than 19 percent by mid-century
(Goss 2010, table 2).
8. The DRTF plan’s benefit reductions are also
more moderate because it eliminates only 88 per-
cent of the 75th-year shortfall, whereas the com-
mission’s plan totally eliminates this shortfall.
9. Additional income tax revenues generated 
by their working longer would also be lost.
10. Author’s calculation based on CBO’s most
recent forecast of the GDP deflator. The CBO
August forecast is slightly different than the
forecast underlying the commission’s baseline.
11. Sixty votes are required to waive a point of order
in the Senate. In the House only a simple 
majority is necessary, but it must be done using
a separate, nonamendable vote.
12. There are other savings as well, such as 
eliminating earmarks ($16 billion).
13.When the commission reported, the top rate 
was scheduled to rise to 39.6 percent in 2011.
The increase has since been postponed to 2013.
The commission’s revenue estimates are based on
a top rate of 39.6 percent and a penultimate rate
of 36 percent rather than the 35 and 33 percent
that will prevail through 2012.
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required to raise the targeted amount of rev-
enues. For example, if every single tax expen-
diture is eliminated, the top marginal individ-
ual rate can be lowered to 23 percent13 and the
top corporate rate from 35 to 26 percent. If
the earned income tax credit and the child
credit are retained because they are of partic-
ular value to the poor, the top individual rate
has to be raised to 24 percent. The commis-
sion provides an illustrative tax plan that
retains politically sensitive tax expenditures,
such as the charitable and mortgage interest
deductions, but limits their value. Under this
variant, the top rate falls only to 28 percent.
In the commission plan, capital gains are
taxed at the same rate as ordinary income and
15 cents per gallon is added to the gas tax.
The tax reform proposed by the DRTF is
more complicated but follows the same philos-
ophy. Most tax expenditures are eliminated, but
a few politically sensitive deductions are
retained. As in the president’s commission plan,
tax expenditures are modified to reduce the rev-
enue loss. The tax treatment of lower-income
groups is simplified as are the many provisions
related to retirement and other savings. Capital
gains are taxed the same as ordinary income.
The top tax rate is lowered to 27 percent.
The most important difference between
the presidential commission’s and the DRTF
plan is that the latter imposes a 6.5 percent
VAT, dubbed a deficit reduction sales tax, that
raises over $3 trillion cumulatively through
2020. As a result, the DRTF plan relies consid-
erably more on revenue increases to solve the
deficit problem than does the president’s com-
mission. Both plans use the chained CPI to
index tax brackets instead of the currently used
CPI. The chained index is considered to be
more accurate and is expected to grow more
slowly in the future, increasing revenue growth.
Tax reform is extremely difficult politically,
because many will perceive themselves to be
losers—those who now rely heavily on tax
expenditures to reduce their tax burdens—
even though they may ultimately benefit from
a deficit reduction that reduces the probabil-
ity of a fiscal meltdown. Revenue-neutral tax
reform is hard enough. Revenue-raising tax
reform is even more difficult, because the
number of perceived losers increases. The
plans of the president’s commission and the
DRTF have taken proposals that superficially
seem implausible politically and made them
seem considerably less implausible. That is
because they have clearly described the most
important benefit of reform—more revenues
can be raised with lower tax rates. This is par-
ticularly important to the conservatives who
now adamantly oppose revenue increases.
They certainly will not accept rate increases in
the current system. Radical reform that allows
more revenue to be raised with lower rates is
probably necessary to get them to accept rev-
enue raising. While it is necessary, it may not
be sufficient. Using a new tax as in the DRTF
proposal will also be a hard sell.
Conclusion
Concern over the nation’s deteriorating
budget outlook is rightly growing. There is no
better evidence than the proliferation of com-
mittees offering diagnoses and solutions from
all segments of the ideological spectrum. The
two most prominent are the presidential com-
mission and the DRTF. Both consist of highly
respected individuals from both parties repre-
senting different ideological perspectives. The
two groups completely agree on the nature of
our budget problem but disagree significantly
on the cure, with the DRTF relying far more
on tax increases and less on spending cuts
than the president’s commission. Nevertheless,
both agree on the need for radical tax reform,
and their options for slowing spending over-
lap considerably. 
Both committees have made an enormous
contribution to the national debate by, first,
clearly describing the sources of the budget
problem, and second, showing that very large
policy changes will be necessary to solve it.
Among the changes they describe are Social
Security and health policy reforms and a rad-
ical makeover of our personal and corporate
income tax systems. Such policy reforms are
highly sensitive politically—so much so that
they are often regarded as being implausible.
The presidential commission and the DRTF
have brought the discussion of radical reforms
into the mainstream and waged an all-out
attack on a variety of sacred cows. In doing so,
they have built upon and reinforced the work
of previous committees, such as that spon-
sored by the National Academies. With so
many groups raising the same issues and dis-
cussing similar policy options, the urgency of
our budget problem and the need for bold
and controversial policy changes to address it
can no longer be denied.
Although there is much discussion of the
need for sacrifices to fix the budget problem,
it is important to remember that fixing the
problem also will bring huge benefits. If the
problem is left to fester and the United States
is engulfed by a fiscal crisis, the entire popu-
lation will feel intense pain (Burman et al.
2010; CBO 2010b). Even if a crisis is a long
way off, large deficits will be draining away
national saving in the interim and slowly
eroding improvements in the standard of 
living. The population will suffer much less
from reforms that slow the growth of social
benefits and raise tax revenues.
Unfortunately, the proposals of various
committees have not been greeted with much
enthusiasm by the president or members of
Congress. But it is certain that the budget
problem will have to be fixed eventually.
When that day comes, policymakers will have
thoughtful policy responses available as the
result of the hard work of these committees.
Let us hope that the policy debate is eventu-
ally provoked by a deliberative process rather
than being forced upon us by a fiscal crisis.•
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sustainable growth-rate physician payment for-
mula, see chapter 5 of Committee on the Fiscal
Future of the United States (2010). For a discus-
sion of the fiscal impact of the ACA and the
CLASS Act, see Palmer and Penner (2010).
5. The commission includes, under the report’s 
recommended approach to tax reform, an adjust-
ment for any changes made to the exclusion. 
6. The chain index would also be used for other
indexed spending programs and to index
individual income tax brackets. For a discussion
of its use to index Social Security benefits, see
Penner (2010). 
7. These are broad averages. A 65-year-old new
retiree at the median of lifetime covered earnings
would experience a benefit reduction of 13 per-
cent in 2050 and 19 percent in 2080, and benefit
reductions for many high lifetime earners would
be far larger than 19 percent by mid-century
(Goss 2010, table 2).
8. The DRTF plan’s benefit reductions are also
more moderate because it eliminates only 88 per-
cent of the 75th-year shortfall, whereas the com-
mission’s plan totally eliminates this shortfall.
9. Additional income tax revenues generated 
by their working longer would also be lost.
10. Author’s calculation based on CBO’s most
recent forecast of the GDP deflator. The CBO
August forecast is slightly different than the
forecast underlying the commission’s baseline.
11. Sixty votes are required to waive a point of order
in the Senate. In the House only a simple 
majority is necessary, but it must be done using
a separate, nonamendable vote.
12. There are other savings as well, such as 
eliminating earmarks ($16 billion).
13.When the commission reported, the top rate 
was scheduled to rise to 39.6 percent in 2011.
The increase has since been postponed to 2013.
The commission’s revenue estimates are based on
a top rate of 39.6 percent and a penultimate rate
of 36 percent rather than the 35 and 33 percent
that will prevail through 2012.
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N
umerous committees have formed
to suggest ways of restoring fiscal
stability. Some come from the
political right or left, but the most
interesting include members who span the
ideological spectrum. The most important is
the president’s National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform (NCFRR 2010).
The president appointed six members drawn
from both political parties, and Democratic
and Republican congressional leaders each
appointed six elected members—three from
the House and three from the Senate. The
commission’s rules stated that Congress had to
consider its recommendations if at least 14
commission members supported them. That
ensured that at least two elected members
from each party had to be on board before the
Congress would be forced to act.
Few budget watchers thought the commis-
sion had any chance of success, especially after
congressional leaders appointed some mem-
bers from the extremes of their parties. But
commission members and their staffs worked
diligently in a collegial fashion. They finally
recommended radical revenue-raising tax
reform, a 15-cent increase in the gas tax, com-
prehensive Social Security reform, options to
restrain growth in federal spending on health
care, and severe caps on defense and nonde-
fense discretionary spending.
Only 11 members ultimately voted for the
commission report, but the fact that it got
more than majority support was a notable
achievement. Moreover, support spanned the
ideological spectrum from Senator Tom
Coburn (R, OK), one of the most conservative
members of the Senate, to Senator Richard
Durbin (D, IL), a solid liberal. Although the
Republican Party has adamantly opposed tax
increases, three Republican senators voted for
a plan that contained significant new revenues.
The commission claimed that by 2020, roughly
70 percent of its deficit reduction would come
from slowing noninterest spending growth
and 30 percent from revenue increases.1 In the
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•the president’s national Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Debt
Reduction task Force are the most prominent
deficit-reduction committees.
•both agree that social security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid reforms are necessary.
•the committees have advocated policy options
such as tax reforms that otherwise would 
have been politically infeasible.
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